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conscience and investigate diligently whether it agrees with the laws of that all-
power of which we are a small part and through which alone we exist. 
Professor Jodl praises very highly the French institution of a so-called purely 
moral instruction in the public schools. Father H. Gruber, however, points out 
some serious shortcomings in this system of moral education, resuling from a lack 
of principle. (See Stimmeii aus Maria-Loach, Freiburg i. B., 1892, No. 4.) 
It is apparent that moral commands cannot be based upon purely subjective 
notions or ideals, they must be based upon some objective authority which is a 
power that enforces obedience. Such a power exists. It is the world in which we 
live. It is that All-being of which we are a part. And that feature of nature which 
enforces that conduct which we call moral is named God in the terminology of re-
ligious language. 
A consideration like this points out the way to a reconciliation between science 
and religion. There is a truth in the old religions, and this truth need only be 
purified from the errors that cluster about it, hiding its grandeur, beauty, and im-
portance. Let the church and its authorities recognise science and the principle of 
free investigation ; let them be ready to accept the scientific methods of research ; 
let them be willing to accept truth as it can be proved by arguments and verified 
by experience as well as by experiments ; and we need no longer worry about dog-
matism and the narrowness of their sectarian doctrines. All these accidental feat-
ures of religion will, then, pass away, and we shall have a religion which the scien-
tist and the philosopher can embrace. 
This is what we call the Religion of Science; and the Religion of Science is 
bound to be the religion of the future. The Religion of Science will not abolish 
the religions of the past, but it will develop them, broaden them, perfect them, into 
the cosmical religion of humanitarianism. 
To teach an ethics that either has no sanction, or whose sanction is built upon 
the diverging opinions of individuals, will not do. Ethics must be based upon the 
sanction of some objective authority, and the recognition of an objective author-
ity, of a power which enforces a certain kind of conduct, being religion, we say 
that no ethics can be without a religious basis. 
The problem at present is not how to teach irreligious ethics—all such attempts 
are failures at the start; but to change the mythology of the old religions into a 
clear, scientific conception of the natural conditions which demand of man that he 
should observe those rules which we are wont to call moral. p. c. 
T H E F U T U R E POSITION OF LOGICAL THEORY. 
In last October's number of The Morn's/, Professor John Dewey gives a sketch 
of what in his view is " the present position of logical theory." According to this 
the basis of the position seems to be that " the only possible thought is the reflec-
tion of the significance of fact," and that therefore logic, which is the science of the 
laws of thought, rests in reality on an objective basis. He supports Hegel in de-
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nying " the existence of any faculty of thought which is other than the expression 
of fact itself." Now it is doubtless the case that this is the position at present taken 
up by a large number of logicians, but as this position seems to me to be funda-
mentally erroneous I should like to put before your readers what I hope will be 
" the future position of logical theory." I have elsewhere worked out in some de-
tail a theory of reasoning which differs from that commonly accepted chiefly in 
this, that it recognises not two, but three kinds of reasoning, which I call Objective, 
Subjective, and Symbolic. Reasoning is commonly divided into two branches, de-
noted by various pairs of terms, such as Objective and Subjective, Inductive and 
Deductive, Empirical and Formal. The lines of division indicated by these various 
pairs of terms are not quite identical; but they none of them indicate what seems 
to me the most important distinction of all, namely that between real, and symbolic 
argument. There does exist (I will not say a " faculty of thought," but) a method 
of argument which " i s other than the expression of fact itself," whether of objec-
tive or of subjective fact. The term "formal reasoning" is indeed often used to 
denote this kind of argument, but this is a bad name to give it, since it seems to im-
ply, and frequently is held to imply, that it deals with the forms of objective or 
subjective facts, whereas in reality it deals only with symbols, which are arbitrarily 
defined, and which do not necessarily correspond to any things whatever, whether 
objective or subjective. That this kind of argument not only exists, but flourishes 
is evident as soon as it is grasped that pure mathematics is nothing but a branch of 
symbolic logic. It may be that there exists somewhere a fact of which any con-
ceivable mathematical formula might be regarded as the reflexion, but it must 
surely be evident that it was not to the reflexion of such facts that mathematical 
formulae in general owe their existence or validity. It may perhaps be true " that 
fact, reality is significant," and even that thoughts are themselves such significant 
realities, but it is the thoughts that are given to us first, or rather sensations which 
are the elements of thoughts, and we can only infer the realities from them, and not 
vice versa. 
The essence of my theory of logic may be briefly stated thus. The meaning 
of a logical term contains two parts, its denotation and its connotation. Either of 
these parts may be laid down arbitrarily as its definition, leaving the other part 
which I call its import to be found out by experience. To understand both parts of 
the meaning of any term is therefore to possess real knowledge. Pure symbolic 
reasoning deals only with the definitions of terms, and is not therefore founded on 
real knowledge, nor can it alone ever lead to real knowledge. Thus if in any propo-
sition the definitions of the terms are deducible from one another, the proposition 
may be proved symbolically and is what I call a truism : it gives no real informa-
tion. But if the definitions of the terms are independent of each other, and yet not 
inconsistent, the proposition can only be intended to assert the identity of the im-
ports of the terms; it therefore ascribes import to the terms and gives real infor-
mation, whether true or false. If any terms in a symbolic argument are however 
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known to have real import, it may be ascribed to them in real propositions, and 
any conclusions of the argument which contain only such terms will ipso facto be 
made to yield real information, which may be new in the sense that it was not be-
fore recognised, though it was of course implied in the real assertion or assertions 
which ascribed import to the terms of the symbolic argument. 
It is in this way possible to separate any science into two branches, one of 
which consists purely of symbolic argument founded on definitions alone, while the 
other may be expressed in a series of propositions, the definitions of whose terms 
are independent of each other, and which ascribe real import (whether objective or 
subjective) to the terms of the symbolic science, or some of them. 
This is as far as pure logic can go. The question how the truth of any real 
propositions comes t o be known is not, in my opinion, any part of logical theory, 
but belongs to metaphysics. However that is no reason for not discussing it here, 
especially as it is the chief question discussed in Professor Dewey's paper. 
"Tru th " means some sort of consistency in a proposition. We may compare 
a symbolic argument to a game with counters, the rules of which are laid down 
arbitrarily, and to say that a given conclusion of such an argument is true only 
means that the game has been "played fair." But the truth of a real proposition 
does not depend on any arbitrary rules. It expresses a consistency between two 
real facts, either that two named groups of things possess certain common attri-
butes, or that certain of the things possessing named groups of attributes are iden-
tical. The essential element of all real knowledge is then a connecting link be-
tween a thing and an attribute, such as is afforded by a well-understood word. 
Now the only " th ings" which we can apprehend directly are our subjective 
sensations and conceptions. We can compare two or more sensations or concep-
tions, and recognise in them common attributes. Thus I can say of my own knowl-
edge that the sensations I denote by " the taste of sugar " and " the taste of lead 
acetate" have a common attribute, which I call "sweetness." This is a real as-
sertion, for its truth is not deducible from the definitions of its terms, and yet I 
know, by direct apprehension, that it is true. But it is only a subjective truth. 
The corresponding objective assertion would be sugar and acetate of lead both pro-
duce, when tasted, the sensation of sweetness. And I have no direct apprehension 
of this fact. That the tastes referred to in the former proposition were produced 
by objective things denoted by the terms sugar and acetate of lead, can only be in-
ferred by the process called induction, which can never lead to a positive or ne-
cessary truth. 
Thus we may from a pure symbolic science proceed one step further, to a sub-
jective science, by the aid of direct apprehension, and the results of such a subjec-
tive science may in certain cases attain the position of absolute, or necessary truths. 
But on the other hand, all objective sciences must rest on induction. Now the 
true nature of induction is, I am persuaded, commonly misapprehended, because it 
is not realised sufficiently clearly that the prime data of induction are not them-
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selves objective, but subjective facts. An "objective fact" is really only an hy-
pothesis, postulated to account for certain of our subjective sensations. The only 
justification for making such an hypothesis is that it actually does explain certain 
sensations, and the measure of its probability (for we can never assert it as a ne-
cessary certainty) is the number and complexity of the sensations which it accounts 
for. The first of all such objective hypotheses is that we have an objective envi-
ronment to whose action our sensations, or some of them, are due. This suggests 
at once a more general hypothesis, commonly known as the law of causation 
namely that the conditions obtaining in the objective universe at any one moment 
are the effective causes of those obtaining at the next, and so at any subsequent mo-
ment. These two hypotheses, together with certain subsidiary ones, do suffice to 
account for an enormous number, if not all, of our sensations, and so we are justi-
fied in entertaining them. But to leave out the notion of effective causation, and to 
substitute a mere rule of sequence, is to remove the only justification we have for 
assuming the hypothesis of causation at all. It is perhaps conceivable that the hy-
pothesis may be false, that our sensations are not "caused by" an objective envi-
ronment but if so what reason remains for believing in that environment at all ? I 
can never know anything whatever about an objective universe, unless some of my 
sensations about which alone I know anything directly, are caused by that universe. 
It is perhaps thinkable that there should be an objective universe in which events 
occur which in no sense cause my subjective sensations, but to which those sensa-
tions nevertheless happen to correspond; but if this is so the sensations afford me 
no ground whatever for believing in the occurrence of the events, or the objectivity 
of the universe. 
Well then, the essence of induction is the assumption of an hypothesis to ac-
count for observed facts—first of all of directly observed sensations, and then of 
facts assumed to be objective in virtue of the primary hypothesis. That this ac-
count of induction is the true one is I think particularly enforced by the consideration 
of those cases to which at first sight it does not seem to apply. A common example 
of induction is afforded by our belief that the sun will rise to-morrow. Thai it has 
risen every morning for the last four thousand years or more is no reason whatever 
for believing that it will rise to-morrow, unless it is held to point to some explana-
tory hypothesis. Such an hypothesis has actually been framed by astronomers, and 
no one would now pretend to found his belief in the sun's rising to-morrow on the 
mere fact that it has often risen before, but would go on to explain that it must rise 
unless the earth were to stop revolving, etc. If at Monte Carlo the red turned up 
ten times running, would that be any reason for expecting it to turn up again, the 
eleventh time ? No, it would not unless the succession of reds seemed to point to 
some explanatory hypothesis, such as a defect in the roulette. Again, the fact that 
in the last fifty years the death rate in London has been about twenty-eight per 
thousand would be no reason for believing that it will be about that figure this year 
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except on the assumption that the constancy of the death rate indicated certain con-
stant causes, which we have no reason to believe have been altered this year. 
Having once assumed that our environment is objective, and as a corollary the 
hypothesis of causation, the whole of physical science follows, step by step. Sub-
sidiary hypotheses are introduced at each stage and justified by the way they ac-
count for observed results. To show how a single hypothesis is capable of explain-
ing a large number of observed results, the full meaning of the hypothesis is eluci-
dated by symbolic reasoning. By such reasoning it is for example shown that the 
same hypothesis, of universal gravitation, is capable of accounting, not only for the 
movements of the stars, but for the tides, the flow of rivers, the falling of unsup-
ported bodies, the rising of baloons, the movements of the balance in Cavendish's 
experiment, and so on. That such wide extensions of an hypothesis are possible 
tends greatly to confirm, not only the hypothesis itself, but the fundamental hypoth-
eses of objectivity and causation also. But it does not prove either the one or the 
others. We cannot know anything about the objective universe with absolute cer-
tainty, but we may reasonably believe a certain hypothesis about it with any degree 
of conviction we think suitable ; that is we may (and of course we actually do) act 
on all occasions ns if we knew absolutely that they were true. 
We may then believe, and I for one do believe, not only in the objectivity of 
the universe, but that even my own subjective sensations are mere bye-products of 
that universe. I believe that objective facts are, if I may so express it, more real 
than subjective sensations ; that in fact the objective universe might have existed, 
and might exist again without any subjective element in it anywhere. But I cannot 
X'HUTC this, it is with me a matter of faith. Thus I cannot agree with Hegel, that 
"a l l possible thought is the reflexion of the significance of fact" (except perhaps in 
the sense that thought is the reflexion of the significance of certain changes in the 
grey matter of the brain) for this would seem to imply that stupid or contradictory 
thoughts reflected stupid or contradictory significance in certain facts. But I be-
lieve that men of science are gradually evolving a system of thought which will 
more and more faithfully reflect the significance of fact, and that thus science is 
actually building up truth. But all science must begin with, and be founded upon, 
subjective knowledge, and therefore any theory of positivism contradicts itself 
for it must be founded on faith. Science is thus founded on faith, faith in things 
not directly apprehended, just as truly as religion is. It is only because we uncon-
sciously acquire this faith in our infancy, and that it is in most cases amply justified 
by subsequent experience, that we do not even recognise the fact that it is faith, in 
exactly the same sense that belief in God is. But just as men have sometimes lost 
their faith in God, so it may happen to a man to loose his faith in reality, and logic 
is quite as incapable of shaking a man out of the one position as out of the other. 
This I take it is the key to the agnosticism of such men of science as Mr. 
Huxley. I do not for a moment suppose that Mr. Huxley believes less than most 
men ; he probably has good grounds for believing a great deal more. Only he 
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rightly refuses to say that he knows facts of which he can have had no direct ap-
prehension and which he can only infer more or less probably, to be true. Hypo-
theses which as we push our investigations are shown to be capable of explaining 
more and more facts, that is, ultimately, more and more sensations, will in the end 
come to be believed in without doubt or hesitation. If a man says he knows the 
law of gravitation to be trne, he commits a logical blunder ; but there is nothing to 
prevent a scientific man from believing in any miracle or prodigy, so long as the 
account he gives of it does not contradict itself. Not only may two equally reason-
able men form very different estimates of the probability of the same event, even 
with the same evidence before them, but one man may put his faith to a proposi-
tion with admittedly much lower degree of probability than would be required to 
convince another. Only, a scientific man will always distinguish between what he 
knows and what he believes, and will admit that though he has made up his mind 
to act us if he knew to be true the propositions he only believes to be so, yet an-
other man may reasonably take a different view of any one of them. 
Trin. Coll., Cambridge, Jan. 8, 1892. EDWARD T. DIXON. 
COMTE AND TURGOT. 
On page 410 of the last number of The Monist, it was stated that the doctrine 
of the three stages of knowledge was not properly a Comtean idea but belonged to 
Turgot. The following letter from Professor Schaarschmidt of Bonn informs us 
of the passages in Turgot where the statement of the doctrine is found : 
. To the Editor of The Monist : 
To your note of inquiry of the 22d of last month I have the honor to reply, 
that the Comtean theory of the trois dints may be traced back to utterances of Tur-
got made by him in his Second discotirs stir les progrcs snccessi/s de /'esprit /inmain 
prononcd le 21/ie ddcembre /7J0—namely in the Sorbonne. You will find the dis-
course referred to in the edition of the works of Turgot which I now have before 
me, namely that of Guillaumin, Paris, 1844, in Vol. II, at pages 597 et seqq. The 
passage in question is found at p. 600-601. However, it is highly probable that the 
so-called loi des trois itats was directly transmitted to Comte by St. Simon, who 
reproduced the idea of Turgot in his Introduction attx travattx scientiftques dtt 
X/.Yme Sicc/e, at pages 62-63. F ° r Comte was dependent in many respects on St. 
Simon, while it is probable that he had never studied Turgot. To St. Simon, in 
fact, is due the expression "philosophie positive," as well as the germ-notion of 
the division of the Sciences, which Comte further elaborated. 
SCHAARSCHMIDT. 
